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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.,4 the Supreme Court of Ohio decided a case 
that promises to have a significant impact on Ohio employment law. There, the 
court held that an employee who is discharged or disciplined for 
whistleblowing may bring a common-law cause of action for wrongful 
discharge based on either the public policy in the Ohio whistleblower statuteS 
or the policy set forth in the Occupational Safety and Health Act.6 The court 
overruled an earlier decision in which it had held that no common-law cause 
of action exists in Ohio for whistleblowing? 
This Article briefly traces the history of the employment-at-will doctrine 
from its origins in the English common law through the present.B It also 
examines the exceptions to this doctrine that have arisen during the twentieth 
century and, in particular, the "public policy" exception.9 Next, the Article 
analyzes how Ohio courts have narrowed the at-will doctrine since 1990.10 The 
Article then examines the Kulch decision and responds to a recent article that 
favorably analyzes Kulch.ll Finally, the Article concludes that this case is 
improperly decided because it usurps the right of the legislature to establish 
4677 N.E.2d 308 (Ohio 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 586 (1997). 
soma REv. CoDE ANN.§ 4113.52 (West 1998). 
629 u.s.c. § 651 (1994). 
7Phung v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986), overruled by Kulch v. 
Structural Fibers, Inc., 677 N .E.2d 308 (Ohio 1997). 
BSee infra notes 12-19 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 26-67 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 68-95 and accompanying text. 
11Sandra J. Rosenthal, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc: Clarifying the Public Policy 
Exception, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 681 (1998) [hereinafter "Clarifying the Public Policy"]. 
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public policy in statutes and because it will lead to further confusion and 
unpredictability in Ohio employment law. 
A. History of the At-Will Employment Doctrine 
The employment-at-will doctrine permits an employer to discharge an 
at-will employee for any reason, or no reason at all, without liability.12 
Essentially, this rule of contract construction creates a rebuttable presumption 
that, absent a term of duration, an employment relationship may be terminated 
by either party at will.13 
In the past two decades, courts and legislatures have taken steps to limit 
application of the employment-at-will doctrine in the private employment 
relationship.l4 Recent changes in the at-will employment arena have 
12Mark A. Fahlson, The Public Policy Exception to Employment At Will: When Should 
Courts Defer to the Legislature?, 72 NEB. L. REv. 956, 956 (1993). While this doctrine is 
unique to the United States, its origins can be found in the English common law. Under 
English common law, an employment contract of indefinite duration, absent reasonable 
cause for discharge, was presumed to extend for one year. Id. at 959 (citing WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE,COMMENTARIESONTHELAWSOFENGLAND425(21sted.1847). "[l]fthehiring 
be general, without any particular time limited, the law construes it to be hiring for a 
year; upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall serve, and the master 
maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective seasons, as well when 
there is work to be done as when there is not." Id. 
The American doctrine of employment-at-will gained further recognition in 
Horace Gay Wood's treatise on the law of master and servant. See HORACE G. WooD, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAw OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1877). The treatise explained: "with us 
the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and 
if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it 
by proof .... [I]t is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, 
and in this respect there is no distinction between domestic and other servants." Id. at 
272. (footnote omitted) 
However, even under the "traditional formulation" of the at-will employment 
doctrine, it only applies to "contracts of indefinite duration." BRADD N. SIEGEL & JoHN 
M. STEPHEN, OHIO EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LAw 114 (1997). In contrast, "[c]ontracts for 
a specified term ... are not terminable 'at will' by either party prior to the expiration of 
the term." Id. 
13J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A Modest Proposal to 
De-Marginalize Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. REv. 347, 379 (1995) (citing Forrer v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 153 N.W.2d 587,589-90 (Wis. 1967)); see also Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining 
With Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perception Of Legal Protection In An At-Will 
World, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 105 (1997) (stating that while unions typically negotiate 
collective bargaining agreements that include "just-cause" termination provisions, most 
non-union, private sector employees are employed at-will). 
14The erosion of this doctrine is arguably one of the most significant employment 
law developments in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., 
Beyond Collective Bargaining and Employment At Will: The Future Of Wrongful Dismissal 
Claims: Where Does Employer Self Interest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 397 (1989) (advocating 
drafting of state wrongful dismissal statutes to codify and integrate the law of employee 
dismissals); Cheryl S. Massingale, At-Will Employment: Going, Going . .. , 24 U. RicH. L. 
REv. 187,187 (1990) ("[T]he current system, which has evolved through judicially created 
exceptions, is expensive, time consuming and does not serve either party well."). 
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dramatically impacted the predictability and stability of this area of the law 
and resulted in unnecessary burden and expense for employers.15 These 
changes have been extensively critiqued.16 
The employment-at-will relationship evolved during the late nineteenth 
century. In the context of the industrial revolution, the at-will relationship was 
"well suited to employer needs in America's developing industrial and 
commercial society."17 The underlying premise of the employment-at-will 
doctrine was the desire to preserve managerial discretion in the workplace and 
to maintain freedom of contract.lS Proponents of this doctrine argued that it 
provided incentives for workers to be productive; that is, employees worked 
harder in order to keep their jobs.19 
B. Limiting the Employment-At-Will Doctrine 
The employment-at-will doctrine remained intact well into the twentieth 
century20 and reached its peak in 1915 following the United States Supreme 
l5See DawnS. Perry, Determining Egregious Violations of Public Policy: A Proposed 
Amendment To The Model Employment Termination Act, 67 WASH. L. REv. 915, 915 (1992) 
(discussing erratic nature of wrongful termination litigation in light of public policy 
exception); Perritt, supra note 14; Massingale, supra note 14. 
l6See, e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting 
The Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Cornelius J. Peck, 
Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change In The Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 
(1979); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time For A 
Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); Eugene N. Lindenbaum, The Status of the Employment 
At-Will Doctrine in Ohio: Ohio Incorporates A Public Policy Exception, 52 OHio ST. L.J. 315 
(1991) (examining why Ohio Supreme Court should use the whistleblower statute as a 
mandate for adopting a broad public policy exception); David G. Gibson, Note, 
Expanding the Public Policy Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Borse v. Piece 
Goods Shop, Inc., 38 VILL. L. REv. 1527 (1993) (examining impact of Third Circuit's 
recognition of public policy exception in the context of employer drug testing); Richard 
A. Epstein, In Defense Of The Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984) (arguing in 
favor of the doctrine of employment-at-will). 
17Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding The Development 
of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719,722 (1991) (examining the origin 
and development of the employment-at-will doctrine). 
IS Darlington v. General Elec., 504 A.2d 306,309 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). As one court 
explained, 
men must be left, without interference, to buy and sell where they please, 
and to discharge or retain an employee at will for good cause or for no 
cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful 
act per se. It is a right which an employee may exercise in the same way, 
to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the employer. 
Payne v. Western Atlantic R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled in part by 
Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915). 
19Jones, infra note 62, at 1141 (explaining that the employment-at-will doctrine is 
based on the assumption that employers need complete freedom of contract to conduct 
business and promote industrial growth). 
20See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,64 (1905) (holding that courts could not 
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Court's decision in Coppage v. Kansas.21 In Coppage, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a statute which prevented employers from discharging or refusing 
to hire employees because of union membership.22 The Court explained: 
[S]ince it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in common, 
some persons must have more property than others, it is from the 
nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right 
of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate 
those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise 
of those rights.23 
In 1937, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,24 the Supreme Court first 
limited the at-will employment rule by upholding the Wagner Act, which 
prohibited employers from discharging employees for union membership.25 
After Jones & Laughlin, courts and legislatures began to carve out exceptions to 
the at-will employment doctrine. These exceptions have three bases: contract 
law, tort law; and, most recently, legislative acts. 
1. Contract Exceptions to the At-Will Doctrine 
Under contract theory, an employee's work by itself, without additional 
consideration, only entitled him to a wage and supported no promise of job 
security.26 Absent a promise by the employee to work for his employer for a 
fixed period of time, the employee could not infer a promise to retain his 
services for a fixed period.27 
Courts have "struggled to find a rationale that would permit them to uphold 
such promises or representations," such as those found in employee handbooks 
interfere with the freedom of master and servant to contract with each other), overruled 
in part by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952). 
21236 U.S. 1 (1915), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 
(1941). 
22Jd. at 26. 
23[d. at 17. 
24301 u.s. 1 (1937). 
25[d. 
26Lindenbaum, supra note 16, at 317 (quoting Note, Protecting At Will Employees 
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 
1816, 1825 (1980)). Contract theory necessarily entails the freedom of parties to bargain 
and exchange promises. This theory originated in laissez-faire economies where the 
marketplace operates free of government restrictions and interventions. These theories 
prevailed in American society when the prevailing view was that "what was good for 
private enterprise was good for all." See also Mayor G. Freed & Darrel D. Polsby, The 
Doubtful Provenance of "Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 558 (1990) (noting 
the employment at-will doctrine was "the natural offspring of a capitalist economic 
order"). 
27[d. 
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or policy manuals, or oral representations, despite the at-will rule.28 Some 
courts characterized such promises as "implied-in-fact contracts," other courts 
have characterized such representations as "implied-in-law covenants of good 
faith and fair dealing," and still others analyze such promises under estoppel 
theories.29 
Courts consider the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
where an employee claims a right to receive the benefits of his employment 
agreement and, in some states, where an employee has asserted a "bad cause" 
discharge.30 Under this theory, courts infer mutual promises between the 
employer and employee that neither party to the employment agreement will 
do anything that will impair the right of the other to receive the benefits of the 
agreement.31 Some courts and commentators have refused to apply this 
exception because of its vagueness.32 
The "implied-in-fact contract" exception allows an employee to establish an 
employment contract by proof of "an implied promise of continued 
employment established by oral representations, a course of dealing, personnel 
manuals, or memoranda," and the like.33 Under this exception, an employee 
28Siegel & Stephen, supra note 12, at 116. 
29M. D. Moberly & Carolann E. Doran, The Nose of the Camel: Extending the Public 
Policy Exception Beyond the Wrongful Discharge Context, 13 THE LABOR LAWYER 371 n.1 
(1997); Siegel & Stephen, supra note 12, at 116. 
The distinctions between such theories are difficult to draw and difficult 
to comprehend and, indeed, the courts themselves frequently appear 
confused by some of the more arcane theorizing that accompanies this 
exercise .... Ultimately, however, each of these theories focuses on the 
reasonableness of the employee's expectation that the employer would 
indeed provide job security or certain benefits. 
Id. (footnote omitted) 
3D Moberly & Doran, supra note 29, at 371 n.l. 
31Parker, supra note 13, at 361-62; see also Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 364 
N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56 (Mass. 1977) (finding implied covenant of good faith in contract 
where employee was at-will). 
32See, e.g., Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841,851 (Kan. 1987) (explaining that the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing is too broad and should not be applicable to at-will 
contracts); Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549,554 (Okla. 1987) (refusing to impose upon 
employers a legal duty not to terminate at-will employees in bad faith); see also Robert 
S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195,262-63 (1968) ("[good faith]" functions to rule out 
many different forms of bad faith ... any general definition of good faith, if not vacuous, 
is sure to be unduly restrictive, especially if cast in statutory form"); Parker, supra note 
13, at 359 (arguing that implied covenant analysis should be abandoned). 
33Moberly & Doran, supra note 29, at 371 n.1; see also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 
765 P.2d 373, 384 (Cal. 1988) (ordinary rules of contract interpretation permit proof of 
implied terms; no basis for requiring special consideration); Coelho v. Posi-Seal Int'l, 
Inc., 544 A.2d 170, 176 (Conn. 1988) (promise of employment security becomes 
enforceable as soon as employee enters employment; no reliance beyond performance 
of regular services legally required as consideration); Watson v. Idaho Falls Consol. 
Hosps., Inc., 720 P.2d 632, 636 (Idaho 1986) (employee handbook creates binding 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss1/4
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may allege breach of contract arising from an oral promise or course of 
conduct.34 
Courts have applied this theory where an employee alleges that a promise 
of employment for a particular period of time should be inferred from the 
parties' conduct or written materials.35 For example, personnel materials can 
contain representations that may bind employers in job security or discharge 
procedures.36 Courts have declined to employ this exception as it denigrates 
traditional contract theory by transforming an "at will contract into a just cause 
contract."37 
Some jurisdictions, including Ohio, analyze an employer's promises or 
representations under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.38 As the Supreme 
Court of Ohio explained, holding that promissory estoppel is a separate and 
independent exception to the at-will rule: 
[w ]here appropriate, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable 
and binding to oral employment-at-will agreements when a promise 
which the employer should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the part of the employee does induce such action or 
forbearance, if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise. 
The test in such cases is whether the employer should have reasonably 
expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if 
so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and 
was detrimental to the employee.39 
There are conceptual differences between the implied-in-fact contract 
exception and promissory estoppel.40 For example, unlike an implied-in-fact 
contract, promissory estoppel does not require that there be a "meeting of the 
minds" or an agreement, express or implied, between the parties; it is enough 
that there is "a promise which the employer should reasonably expect to induce 
unilateral contract). 
34Perritt, supra note 14, at 398. 
35Lindenbaum, supra note 16, at 319. 
36See Fahlson, supra note 12, at 962. 
37Parker, supra note 13, at 355 (explaining that "[e]mployees cannot rely upon the 
implied covenant as an independent basis of protection in at-will contracts precisely 
because its invocation calls for a tremendous act of will on the part of a court"); see also 
Buehner Block Co. v. U.W.C. Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988) (explaining "a 
cardinal rule in construing such a contract is to give effect to the intentions of the 
parties"). 
38Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150, 155 (Ohio 1985) (recognizing 
promissory estoppel exception to the at-will employment doctrine). 
39[d. 
40Siegel & Stephen, supra note 12, at 487. 
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action or forbearance .... "41 The "most important difference may be the nature 
of relief awarded."42 As one court explained in a case involving promises in a 
personnel manual: 
Promissory estoppel does not necessarily operate as a substitute for 
consideration, nor does its application create a binding contract where 
none existed before. Rather, the doctrine is used to avoid injustice, and 
the remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires. Thus, 
the trial court need only enforce the manual's promises as justice 
. 43 
reqmres. 
2. Tort-Based Exceptions to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine 
Courts also rely on tort-based theories in formulating exceptions to the 
employment-at-will doctrine. Tort theories generally offer more expansive 
remedies than do contract theories.44 
The most prevalent tort-based exception is the public policy exception.45 The 
underlying theory supporting this exception is that "basic public policy 
overrides the freedom of contract embodied in the traditional at will rule."46 
One court explained that this tort seeks to achieve a "proper balance ... 
among the employer's interest in operating a business efficiently and 
profitably, the employee's interest in earning a livelihood, and society's interest 
in seeing its public policies carried out."47 Most states have recognized this 
tort,48 although its acceptance is not universal.49 
41Jd. at 487-88. 
42Jd. at 489. 
43Jones v. East Ctr. for Community Health, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 969, 974 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1984}, overruled by Stites v. Napolean Spring Works, Inc., No. F-96-002, 1996 WL 660655, 
at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1996); see also Karnes v. Doctors Hosp., 555 N.E.2d 280 
(Ohio 1990). 
44See Kerry L. Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: Contract Rises from the Ashes of the 
Bad Faith Tort, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 483 (1994) (noting that traditionally, tort remedies 
are "more expansive" than contract remedies). 
45For a state-by-state survey of wrongful discharge law, see Littler, Mendelson, THE 
1997 NATIONAL EMPLOYER 149-213 (1997 ed.). 
46Fahlson, supra note 12, at 963. 
47Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981) (finding 
employee stated cause of action where fired after supplying information to police 
concerning a co-worker's criminal violations). 
48Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680,687 (Cal. 1992}, overruled by Green v. Ralee Eng'g 
Co., 960 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1998) "[T]he vast majority of states have recognized that an 
at-will employee possesses a tort action when he or she is discharged for performing an 
act that public policy would encourage, or for refusing to do something that public 
policy would condemn." I d.; see also Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, 
551 N.E.2d 981, 986 n.3 (Ohio 1990) (acknowledging that at least thirty-nine states 
recognize some form of the public policy exception). 
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Petermann v. International Brotherhood ofTeamsters50 is the seminal case on the 
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. There, an 
employee alleged that his employer had encouraged him to commit perjury 
before a legislative committee and, when he testified truthfully, the employer 
discharged him. The California appellate court held that the employee had a 
right of damages for unlawful termination contrary to the state's public 
policy.Sl In recognizing a new cause of action, the Petermann court found that 
the discharge, in effect, coerced an act prohibited by a criminal statute. 52 
Courts may find public policies by "identifying a specific provision of a 
statute, constitution, or administrative regulation, synthesizing a policy from 
several different statutes or constitutional provisions, identifying a right or 
mode of conduct covered by traditional common-law cause of actions or 
identifying a trade practice or well recognized professional standard."53 In the 
absence of the foregoing provisions, courts have decided "what public policy 
is from [their] own perception of community values and consideration of 
competing interests."54 
49 See, e.g., Caletka v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 936 F. Supp. 380, 382 (W.D. La. 
1996) (refusing to create public policy exception absent legislative mandate); Reich v. 
Holiday Inn, 454 So.2d 982 (Ala. 1984) (explaining Alabama adheres to the general rule 
that a contract of employment "at will" is at the "will of either party"); Evans v. Bibb Co., 
342 S.E.2d 484 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to adopt public policy tort where employee 
terminated for filing workers compensation claim); Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 590 
A.2d 152, 156 (Me. 1991) (explaining that Maine has not yet recognized wrongful 
discharge action); Murphy v. American Home Prod., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983) (refusing 
to recognize the tort of abusive discharge); Pacheco v. Raytheon Co., 623 A.2d 464, 465 
(R.I. 1993) (declining to recognize public policy tort where whistleblower statute 
enacted). 
50344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). 
51 In Petermann, the court explained: 
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public 
policy and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any em-
ployee, whether the employment be for a designated or unspecified 
duration, on the ground that the employee declined to commit perjury, 
an act specifically enjoined by statute. 
Id. at 27. 
52Jd. at 25. 
53 Perritt, supra note 14, at§ 5.10. One state supreme court recently stated: 
The right of a court to declare what is or is not in accord with public 
policy does not extend to specific economic or social problems which 
are controversial in nature and capable of solution only as a result of 
a study of various factors and conditions. It is only when a given 
policy is so obviously for or against the public health, safety, morals 
or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it, 
that a court may constitute itself the voice of the community .... 
Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., No. 24434, 1998 W.Va. LEXIS 33, at *5 (W.Va. 
May 21, 1998) (citing Mamlin v. Genoe, 17 A.2d 407,409 (W.Va. 1941)). 
54 See ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 1375, at 1165 (1962) ("in determining 
what public policy requires, there is no limit whatever to the 'sources' to which the court 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
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This exception may enable an employee to bring a cause of action premised 
upon statutory provisions delineating public policy, although the individual 
fails to meet the statutory prerequisites.SS Essentially, courts have applied this 
theory where an employer adhered to the "letter of the law," but not the "spirit 
of the law."56 Although the term "public policy" cannot be precisely defined, 
courts often consider that the term includes "what is right and just and what 
affects the citizens of the state collectively."57 
The public policy exception has several variants, including (1) refusal to 
commit an unlawful act, (2) fulfilling a public obligation, and (3) exercising a 
right or privilege.ss Cases of the first type include, for example, an employee 
who alleges that her discharge resulted from her refusal to commit a crime.59 
Cases of the second type include those where an employee seeks to participate 
in jury duty.60 Finally, an employee may attribute his discharge to an exercise 
of a right such as filing a workers' compensation claim.61 
3. Legislative Exceptions to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine. 
Advocates of legislative reform in the area of at-will employment argue that 
they seek to restore the "balance, predictability and efficiency" to relationships 
in the employment context.62 One commentator supporting a legislative 
solution has remarked that "the public policy tort can become an amorphous 
source of just cause litigation, unless standards exist for principled 
decision-making, especially at the summary judgment and pleadings stages."63 
Those who support "just cause" legislation also argue that legislation will level 
is permitted to go; and there is no limit to the 'evidence' that the court may cause to be 
produced");Greeleyv. Miami Valley Maint. Contr., Inc.,551 N.E.2d 981,990 (Ohio 1990). 
55 Jones, infra note 62, at 1147 (noting that "if an employer's conduct did not constitute 
a violation of statute because there was a restriction, definition, or exemption contained 
in the statute, the employee could still recover under a tort wrongful discharge theory"). 
But see Contreras v. Ferro Corp., 652 N.E.2d 940 (Ohio 1995) (employee must comply 
with statute to bring public policy claim based on a policy in that statute). 
56 Jones, infra note 62, at 1147. 
57Peck, supra note 16, at 249. 
58 See Parker, supra note 13; see also Perritt, supra note 14. 
59See Petermann, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (employee refused to commit 
perjury at employer's request). 
60See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Ore. 1975). 
61See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973). 
62Marzetta Jones, Note, The 1996 Arizona Employment Protection Act: A Return To The 
Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 39 ARiz. L. REv. 1139, 1140 (1997); see also Janice R. Bellace, 
A Right of Fair Dismissal: Enforcing A Statutory Guarantee, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 207, 231-47 
(1983) (proposing state legislation as method of protecting against unjust dismissals); 
Summers, supra note 16, at 481-501. 
63Perritt, supra note 14, at 407. 
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the playing field by establishing boundaries and guidelines for wrongful 
termination. 64 
In response to the increased litigation in this area, some states have enacted 
legislation governing employee discharges.65 In 1987, Montana became the 
first state to legislatively prohibit wrongful discharge.66 Since then, at least one 
other state has enacted legislation that alters the traditional at-will employment 
rule.67 
II. THE PuBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL 
DOCTRINE IN OHIO 
As recently as 1986, the Supreme Court held the rule in Ohio to be that, absent 
contractual or statutory restrictions, 
the right of an employer to terminate employment at will for any cause, 
at any time whatever, is not absolute, but limited by principles which 
protect persons from gross or reckless disregard of their rights and 
interests, willful, wanton or malicious acts or acts done intentionally, 
with insult, or in bad faith.68 
Accordingly, Ohio employers could discharge employees at any time so long 
as the discharge was not "contrary to law."69 
A. Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc. - Ohio's Seminal Case 
In 1990, in Greeleyv. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc.,7D the Supreme 
Court of Ohio followed the majority of state courts and recognized the tort of 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy as an exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine. Greeley involved an employer who had 
discharged an employee when it learned that he was subject to a child support 
withholding order. The discharge violated an Ohio statute, Ohio Revised Code 
64Jones, supra note 62, at 1140. 
65The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws formulated 
the Model Employment Termination Act in 1991. The Model Act's authors emphasized 
the need for uniformity and sought to address the situation where a employee is hired 
in one state, works in another, and is fired in a third. See Perry, supra note 15, at 916. 
66See MONT. CODE ANN.§§ 39-2-901-39-2-914 (1989). 
67See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 (West 1996) (prohibiting terminated 
employee from claiming wrongful termination unless the employer breached a written 
contract, asked the employee to violate an Arizona statute, or fired the employee in 
retaliation for performing a protected act). 
68fawcett v. G.C. Murphy & Co., 348 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ohio 1976); Phung v. Waste 
Mgmt., Inc.,491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986); Dadas v. Prescott, Ball &Turben, 529 F. Supp. 
203, 206 (N.D. Ohio 1981 ); see also Henkel v. Educational Res. Council of Am., 344 N .E.2d 
118 (Ohio 1976) (explaining that under Ohio law employment is presumed to be at-will). 
69 Phung, 491 N.E.2d at 1116; Mers, 483 N.E.2d 150. 
70551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 1990). 
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section 3113.213(0), which prohibits an employer from discharging or 
disciplining an employee based on a court order to withhold personal 
earnings?l Greeley brought a claim charging that the employer wrongfully 
discharged him because of the wage assignment order. The court of appeals 
affirmed the trial court's dismissal.72 
The Supreme Court reversed. Although it acknowledged that section 
3113.213(0) lacks any remedial provisions, it concluded that "[b ]y enacting R.C. 
3113.213(0), the General Assembly has set forth a policy which prohibits the 
use of a child support withholding order as a basis for discharging an 
employee."73 Because "[i]t is our job to enforce, not frustrate, that policy," held 
the court, "public policy warrants an exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine when an employee is discharged or disciplined for a reason which is 
prohibited by statute."74 
The Greeley court emphasized, however, that "it is clear that the 
employment-at-will doctrine in Ohio is today alive and well in an employment 
relationship which is, without more, clearly at-will."75 Further discussing the 
scope of its holding, the Greeley court stated: 
[The at-will] relationship permits termination of employment for no 
cause or for "any cause" which is not unlawful, at any time and 
regardless of motive. Accepting this, henceforth, the right of employers 
to terminate employment at will for "any cause" no longer includes the 
discharge of an employee where the discha~e is in violation of a 
statute and thereby contravenes public policy. 
The court, however, left open the possibility of future exceptions: 
Today, we only decide the question of a public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine based on violation of a specific statute. 
This is not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions 
71Jd. at 983. OHio REv. CoDE ANN.§ 3113.213(0) (Banks-Baldwin 1994) provides, in 
relevant part: 
No ... employer may use a requirement to withhold personal earnings 
... as a basis for a discharge of, or for any disciplinary action against, 
an employee, or as a basis for a refusal to employ a person. The court 
may fine an employer who so discharges or takes disciplinary action 
against an employee, or refuses to employ a person, not more than 
five hundred dollars. 
72Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, 551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 1990). 
73 Id. at 985. 
74Jd. at 986. The Greeley court distinguished Phung, noting that in Phung there was 
an absence of a "sufficiently clear public policy warranting the creation of a cause of 
action." Id. 
75Jd. at 986-87 (internal citations omitted). 
76Jd. at 987 (internal citations omitted). 
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to the doctrine but, of course, such exceptions would be required to be 
of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.77 
B. Greeley's Progeny 
31 
Only two years later, in Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp.,7B the Supreme Court 
of Ohio revisited the public policy tort. In that case, a materials handler claimed 
that he had been exposed to hazardous dust, chips, and fumes, that his 
employer failed to warn him about the health hazards associated with his work, 
and that it concealed critical information about the work environment. The 
employee brought a common-law tort claim for wrongful discharge, which the 
trial court dismissed?9 The Supreme Court declined to extend the public policy 
exception to reach a "whistleblower" claim that pre-dated the effective date of 
Ohio Revised Code section 4113.52, Ohio's Whistleblower Protection Act. The 
Tulloh court held that "[a]bsent statutory authority, there is no common-law 
basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim."SO Thus, the court construed the 
public policy exception as limited to policies clearly articulated by legislation. 
77 I d. (internal citations omitted). Chief Justice Moyer and Justices Holmes and Wright 
dissented. In addition to acknowledging that creating a public policy exception to the 
employment at will doctrine was "wholly inappropriate judicial discourse, ... "Justice 
Wright stated: 
This sort of approach has potentially enormous consequences for the 
stability of the business community and our state's economy as a 
whole .... [W]e have seemingly, almost by accident, broadened the 
common-law remedy pertaining to wrongful discharge. Some of this 
language may lead to unintended consequences and visit both the 
employer and employee with the worst of all possible worlds by way 
of groundless litigation. In the words of Professor Gould: 
"* * * [E]mployers are subject to volatile and unpredictable juries that 
frequently act without regard to legal instructions. Moreover, the em-
ployees who benefit are few and far between, first, because of the 
difficulties involved in staying the course of a lengthy and expensive 
judicial process, and second, because of the limitations inherent in the 
legal doctrines adopted by the courts." 
Id. at 989 (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: 
A Case for Arbitration, 13 EMP. REL. L.J. 404,413 (1987 /1988)). 
Justice Wright's concern regarding the actual benefits that an employee who 
successfully challenges a discharge enjoys is supported by a 1988 survey by the Rand 
Institute. The Institute found that litigation costs are nearly as high as the average total 
monetary award a successful wrongful termination litigant receives. Mark D. Wagoner, 
Jr., Comment: The Public Policy Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine in Ohio: A 
Need for a Legislative Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1799, 1826 n.104 (1996). 
78584 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 1992), overruled by Painter v. Graley, 639 N.E.2d 51 (Ohio 
1994). 
79 Id. at 732. 
BO[d. at 733. Justice Douglas dissented, stating, "[i]n my judgment, public policy 
clearly demands that a safe workplace be provided, that unsafe working conditions be 
corrected and that employees who voice concerns aimed at correcting unsafe working 
conditions are entitled to protection against retaliatory measures." I d. at 734. 
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In Provens v. Stark County Board of Mental Retardation & Developmental 
Disabilities,81 the Supreme Court of Ohio declined to create an exception to the 
at-will employment doctrine where an employee claimed her public employer 
violated her constitutional rights. The employee alleged that her employer had 
harassed, discriminated against, and disciplined her in violation of, among 
other things, the right to free speech granted in the Ohio Constitution.82 
Declining to extend Greeley by creating an exception based on an alleged 
constitutional violation, the Court reasoned that the public employee had other 
"reasonably satisfactory" statutory and administrative remedies available.83 
Citing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Lucas,B4 the Provens 
court stated: 
[I]t is not incumbent upon this court to engage in the type of 
comparative analysis of the relative merits of various remedies that is 
invited by appellant. Rather, the more appropriate course for this court 
is to defer to the legislative process of weighing conflicting policy 
considerations and creating certain administrative bodies and 
processes for providing remedies for public employees such as 
appellant.85 
Less than two years later, a fractured86 court overruled Tulloh87 and 
expanded the public policy exception. Painter v. GraleyBB involved a city's 
81594 N.E.2d 959 (1992). 
82Jd. 
83 Id. at 965. 
84462 U.S. 367 (1983). The Provens court explained in Bush: 
The question whether to augment a remedial scheme carefully con-
structed by Congress did not tum merely on a determination that 
existing remedies failed to provide complete relief. Instead, the court 
asserted that the decision to create a Bivens-style remedy in those cir-
cumstances turned on a careful evaluation of relevant policy consid-
erations. The court gave special deference to Congress' ability to 
weigh the policy considerations relevant to a determination of whether 
to create a remedy for a harm suffered, and, in the end, deferred to 
Congress' superior expertise, "convinced that Congress [was] in a 
better position to decide whether or not the public interest would 
be served by creating" a Bivens-style remedy in the case. 
Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 965 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 390). 
85Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 965. 
86Justices A. William Sweeney and Resnick concurred in the majority opinion. Chief 
Justice Moyer concurred in paragraphs one and two of the syllabus and in the judgment. 
Justice Wright concurred in paragraph one of the syllabus and in the judgment. Justices 
Douglas and Pfeifer concurred in paragraphs one and three of the syllabus and 
dissented in part. Judge James A. Brogran of the Second Appellate District, who was 
sitting for Justice F.E. Sweeney, dissented. Accordingly, there were only four votes to 
support the paragraph of the syllabus that overruled Tulloh. 
87The Painter court stated that "[s]trict and literal adherence to the syllabus of Tulloh 
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discharge of an unclassified public employee who chose to seek partisan 
elected office while holding public employment. After carving out a broader 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, the Painter court upheld the 
discharge, stating: 
In specifically designating chief deputy clerks to be unclassified, the 
legislature expressed the public policy that they serve at the pleasure 
of those who appointed them. That is, Painter's at-will status as a 
public employee was prescribed by statute, and is not the result of the 
common-law employment-at-will doctrine. In that Painter's dismissal 
did not violate her constitutional rights, the existence of this legislative 
directive precludes us from finding a "sufficiently clear public policy" 
against Painter's dismissal based upon her becoming a candidate for 
office.89 
Regarding the public policy exception, the Painter court held that it was not 
limited, as a matter of law, to "public policy expressed by the General Assembly 
in the form of statutory enactments, but may be also discerned, as a matter of 
law based on other sources, such as the Constitution of Ohio and the United 
States, administrative rules and regulations, and the common law."90 The 
Painter court did not specify the elements of the public policy tort; rather it 
indicated: 
Full development of the elements of the tort of wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy in Ohio [will] result [from] litigation and 
resolution of future cases, as it is through this means that the common 
law develops.91 
would lead to the illogical result that courts could not recognize claims of wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policies where those policies arise from the Constitution 
of Ohio, unless that public policy was also incorporated into a legislative enactment." 
Painter v. Graley, 639 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Ohio 1994). Adherence to Tulloh, however, does 
not seem "illogical" when one considers that "[a]s a general rule, constitutional 
restrictions limit actions by the government, as opposed to actions by private 
individuals." Deiters v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1023, 1027 (M.D. Tenn. 
1993); see also Takach v. Am. Med. Tech., Inc., No. 72247, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 638 
(Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 19, 1998) (dismissing a public policy tort claim for an employer's 
alleged violation of the Open Court provision of the Ohio Constitution after it 
discharged an employee for filing a products liability action against a third party),appeal 
allowed, 696 N.E.2d 1088 (Ohio 1998). 
88639 N.E.2d 51 (Ohio 1994). 
89 Id. at 57. The court noted that its opinion should be limited to public employees. 
I d. at 57 n.9. It is noteworthy that the Painter court felt compelled to expand the scope 
of the tort of wrongful discharge in a case that did not implicate the common law 
doctrine of employment-at-will. 
90Jd. at 52. 
91Jd. at 56. The Painter court suggested that Ohio courts may find useful the analysis 
of Professor Perritt in The Future of Wrongful discharge Dismissal Claims: Where Does the 
Employer Self-Interest Lie?, 58 U. ON. L. REv.397, 398-99 (1989). Painter, 639 N.E.2d at 57 
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Despite expanding the tort beyond statutory enactments, the court stated 
that "[j]udicial policy preferences may not be used to override valid legislative 
enactments, for the General Assembly should be the final arbiter of public 
policy."92 
Although Greeley limited the public policy tort to claims based on policies 
set forth in statutes, Ohio courts have since broadened the tort to include public 
policies in the Ohio constitution, federal statutes, and other sources.93 Ohio 
courts have recognized public policy claims based on such violations as 
retaliation for filing an OSHA complaint, for making an age discrimination 
claim, and for serving jury duty.94 One restriction, however, on a claim based 
on a policy delineated in a statute is that an employee must strictly comply 
with the statute, or the public policy claim will fail.95 
n.8. Professor Perritt's analysis, discussed supra, has not been relied on in any reported 
decisions outside of Ohio. 
92Jd. at 57 (quoting State v. Smorgala, 553 N.E.2d 672, 674 (Ohio 1990)). 
93Painter v. Graley, 639 N.E.2d 51 (Ohio 1994) (holding that the public policy 
exception could be based on the Constitutions of Ohio and the United States, 
administrative rules and regulations, and the common law); see also Devlin v. North 
Shore Door Co., No. 68063, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1958, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 11, 
1995) (holding that discharge of an employee for engaging in actions protected against 
employer interference by section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act gives rise to a 
public policy tort action and rejecting the preemption argument); Stephenson v. Litton 
Sys., Inc., 646 N.E.2d 259 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (finding that discharging a secretary for 
calling 1-800-GRABDUI on her boss violates public policy). 
94Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 308 (Ohio 1997) (reporting health and 
safety concerns to OSHA); Shaffer v. Frontrunner, Inc. 566 N.E.2d 193 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1993) (employee alleged she was terminated for absenteeism resulting from jury duty); 
Livingston v. Hillside Rehabilitation Hosp., 680 N.E.2d 1220 (Ohio 1997) (suggesting a 
public policy claim may be made based on age discrimination); see also Collins v. 
Rizkana, 652 N .E.2d 653,661 (Ohio 1995) ("a cause of action may be brought for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy based on sexual harassment/ discrimination" 
even where the defendant is not an "employer" as defined by the Ohio Civil Rights Act); 
Cage v. Gateways to Better Living, Inc., No. 94 C.A. 44, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2668, at 
*1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1995) (reversing dismissal of employee claim for discharge 
in violation of public policy for refusing an order that would have violated the Nurse 
Practice Act, OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 4723 et seq. (Banks-Baldwin 1998)); Simonelli v. 
Anderson Concrete Co., 650 N.E.2d 488 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (determining that "the act 
of firing an employee for consulting an attorney could serve as the basis for a public 
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine"); Smith v. Troy Moose Lodge No. 
1044, 645 N.E.2d 1352 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (endorsing public policy exception where 
employee fired in retaliation for filing for unemployment benefits); Clipson v. 
Schlessman, 624 N.E.2d 220 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (reversing summary judgment for 
employer in Greeley claim based on alleged handicap discrimination). 
95Contreras v. Ferro Corp., 652 N.E.2d 940 (Ohio 1995). 
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C. Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. 
In April 1997, the Supreme Court decided Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.96 
Kulch was a factory worker who believed his health problems resulted from 
exposure to toxic chemicals in the workplace. He orally complained to his 
employer and then, having received no response, filed a written report with 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"). OSHA 
inspected the facility and found serious violations that were unrelated to 
Kulch's allegations.97 Kulch was discharged. After his discharge, Kulch filed 
suit, alleging that his employer retaliated against him because he had filed a 
complaint with OSHA. The complaint included claims under Ohio Revised 
Code section 4113.52, under the Ohio Whistleblower Protection Act, and for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.98 
The trial court granted summary judgment on the whistleblower claim 
because Kulch had failed to give his employer written notice under the statute. 
The court also granted summary judgment on the public policy claim, holding 
that the statute preempted any public policy claim for whistleblowing.99 The 
court of appeals affirmed. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, in part. Kulch's statutory 
whistleblower claim under section 4113.52(A)(1) failed as a matter of law 
because Kulch had not made the required written report prior to contacting the 
authorities. The court, however, found that section 4113.52(A)(2) does not 
require an employee to notify his employer of the alleged violation prior to 
making a report to the authorities. Accordingly, because there was evidence to 
support application of this subsection, the court reversed summary judgment 
as to this portion of the statutory claim.lOO 
Turning to the public policy claim, the court held that section 4113.52 does 
not preempt a common-law cause of action for whistleblowing.lOl The court 
also held that full compliance with the whistleblower statute allows an 
employee to bring a common-law cause of action for whistleblowing.102 In 
reaching this conclusion, the court found it necessary to overrule its earlier 
holding in Phung that no such exception to the employment-at-will doctrine 
exists. The court further held, separate and apart from the whistleblower 
statute, that where an employer discharges or disciplines an employee for filing 
96677 N.E.2d 308 (Ohio 1997). 
97Jd. at 310. 
98Jd. 
99 Id. at 311. 
lOO[d. at 312. 
lOlKulch, 677 N.E.2d at 312. 
102Jn Contreras, the court held that in order to bring a public policy claim based on the 
whistleblower statute, a plaintiff must strictly comply with the statute. 652 N.E.2d 940, 
940-41 (Ohio 1995). 
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an OSHA complaint, the employee can state a claim for wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy.103 
In analyzing the public policy claim, the court reiterated the analysis 
employed in earlier public policy decisions: 
In reviewing future cases, Ohio courts may find useful the analysis of 
Villanova Law Professor H. Perritt, who, based on review of cases 
throughout the country, has described the elements of the tort as 
follows: 
1. That [a] clear public policy existed and was manifested in a 
state or federal constitution, statute or administrative 
regulation, or in the common law (the clarity element). 
2. That dismissing employees under circumstances like those 
involved in the plaintiff's dismissal would jeopardize the 
public policy (the jeopardy element). 
3. The plaintiff's dismissal was motivated by conduct related to 
the public policy (the causation element). 
4. The employer lacked overriding legitimate business 
justification for the dismissal (the overriding justification 
element).104 
Applying Professor Perritt's analysis, the court concluded that because the 
clarity and jeopardy elements were met, summary judgment was improperly 
granted and that, on remand, Kulch would have the opportunity to prove his 
wrongful discharge claim based on section 4113.52 and OSHA) OS 
Justice Pfeifer concurred in the syllabus and judgment only.106 Although he 
agreed that a common law claim exists for whistleblowing, he also cautioned 
that the "corollary" to this claim is the recognition of "a wide range of reasonable 
defenses" for employers.107 
Justice CooklDS authored a strong dissent that criticized the majority for 
"elevating itself above the General Assembly as architect of Ohio's public 
policy."109 The dissenters reasoned that the decision frustrated Ohio public 
policy by circumventing the remedies in both the Ohio statute and OSHA. They 
further reasoned that it was illogical to permit a private litigant to bring a public 
103 I d. The court also held that the statutory remedies under Ohio Revised Code section 
4113.52 and the remedies for a public policy claim are cumulative, but that a plaintiff is 
not entitled to a double recovery. ld. (paragraphs four and five of the syllabus). 
104Kulch, 677 N.E.2d at 321 (quoting Painter, 639 N.E.2d at 57 n.8 (quoting Perritt, supra 
note 91, at 398-99)). 
105Jd. at 329. 
106Jd. at 329-30. 
107Jd. at 330. 
108Chief Justice Moyer and Justice Lundberg Stratton joined in the dissent. 
109 Kulch, 677 N.E.2d at 330. 
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policy claim based on a federal statute that itself expressly forbade a private 
right of action)lO 
The dissent also noted that in an earlier decision, Collins v. Rizkana,1ll the 
court had stated that where a statute's "coverage provisions form an essential 
part of its public policy," the court should not "extract a policy from the statute 
and use it to nullify the statute's own coverage provisions."112 The dissenters 
explained that this was exactly the effect of Kulch; namely, that the public policy 
in favor of workplace safety was being used to defeat the policy considerations 
that also limited the available relief under the statute)13 
The dissent also took issue with the holding that the whistleblower statute 
does not preempt a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge. 
According to Justice Cook, where rights and remedies are set forth in the same 
statute, there is a presumption that the remedies are intended to be exclusive.114 
She reasoned, further, that the majority improperly "reverses the presumption 
of exclusivity" when it concludes that because the statute did not contain the 
words "sole and exclusive," it did not preempt a common law claim)lS 
Finally, the dissent disagreed with the majority's "eviscerat[ion]" of 
summary judgment in order to reach the public policy issue and expand the 
holding of Greeley.ll6 The dissent noted that in order to distinguish this case 
from Contreras, the majority had to conclude that plaintiff had preserved its 
argument for applicability of subsection (A)(2), notwithstanding the apparent 
abandonment of this argument in the lower courts)17 
Ill. A RESPONSE TO KULCH v. STRUCTURAL FIBERS, INC.: CLARIFYING THE 
PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
In a recently published law review article,118 author Sandra J. Rosenthal 
argues that Kulch is a positive development in Ohio tort law because it further 
erodes the employment-at-will doctrine. According to the author, Kulch "marks 
the culmination of a trend in Ohio to expand the public policy exception 
doctrine and provide much needed protection for the rights of employees."119 
llOJd. at 330-31. 
111652 N.E.2d 653,658 (Ohio 1995). 
ll2Kulch, 677 N.E.2d at 332 (quoting Collins, 652 N.E.2d at 661). 
ll3Jd. 
ll4Jd. at 332. 
ll5Jd. at 333. 
ll6Jd. at 334. 
ll7Kulch, 677 N.E.2d at 334. 
118Sandra J. Rosenthal, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.: Clarifying the Public Policy 
Exception, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 681 (1998) (hereinafter "Clarifying the Public Policy"). 
ll9Clarifying the Public Policy, supra note 118, at 683. 
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She argues that employees will now be able to "obtain full and fair redress" for 
wrongful treatment by employers and, at the same time, that this decision will 
promote Ohio public policies.l20 
In addition to analyzing Kulch, the author discusses Kulch's impact by 
focusing on two other Supreme Court public policy tort decisions. First, the 
author discusses Provens,121 a 1992 case in which the Supreme Court held that 
a public employee cannot bring a public policy claim for wrongful discharge 
based on the Ohio Constitution where other "reasonably satisfactory" remedies 
are available.l22 The author suggests that this holding "does not make sense in 
light of Kulch" and will have to be reexamined.123 
The second case, decided three months after Kulch, is Livingston v. Hillside 
Rehabilitation Hospitaz.124 There, the court of appeals had declined to recognize 
a public policy claim based on age discrimination because the applicable Ohio 
age discrimination statute already provided remedies that were as broad as 
those available under a Greeley claim.l25 In a one-sentence opinion joined by 
five justices, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case "on the 
authority of Kulch."126 The author of Clarifying the Public Policy reads this 
decision to stand for the proposition that a plaintiff is entitled, not only to more 
expansive public remedies, but also to a jury trial.127 
Finally, the author suggests that after Kulch, two issues are likely to come to 
the forefront. First, she argues that the predominant issue in future litigation is 
likely to be whether remedies set forth in a statute are exclusive or, alternatively, 
whether Greeley remedies will be available for violations of that statute.128 
Second, as noted, the author argues that Provens will have to be reconsidered)29 
120Jd. at 698. Further, the author argues that Kulch (1) reaffirms the four-part test of 
Professor Perritt, enunciated in earlier court decisions; (2) reaffirms that a public policy 
claim can also be based on federal statutes, the state and federal constitutions, 
administrative rules and regulations, and the common law; and (3) recognizes that an 
employee can bring a public policy claim under OSHA even if he has failed to comply 
with the whistleblower statute. I d. at 693-94. 
121 Provens v. Stark County Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 
594 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1992). 
122Jd. at syllabus. 
123Clarifying the Public Policy, supra note 118, at 698. 
124680 N.E.2d 1220 (Ohio 1997). 
125Jd. at 1227 (Cook, J., dissenting). 
126Jd. 
127The author identifies the right to a jury trial as the "best avenue to obtain such a 
remedy." Clarifying the Public Policy, supra note 118, at 697. 
128 Id. at 698. 
129Jd. 
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A. Kulch Has Usurped the Legislative Prerogative to Set Public Policy and Will 
Engender Further Confusion and Unpredictability 
39 
The unspoken premise behind Clarifying the Public Policy is that further 
erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine is a positive development, even if 
it is accomplished piecemeal and frustrates legislative intent. Whether the 
employment-at-will doctrine should be abolished, judicially, statutorily, or 
otherwise, is beyond the scope of this Article. Clarifying the Public Policy's 
wholesale endorsement of this premise, however, misses the mark with regard 
to two more fundamental questions, which it leaves unanswered. 
First, should the Supreme Court of Ohio be creating public policy, and 
remedies to vindicate this policy, that are directly contrary to the remedies 
established by the General Assembly as part of a comprehensive statutory 
scheme? Second, even if the Court arguably is vested with the responsibility to 
shape new common-law remedies based on its vision of public policy, will this 
advance the twin goals of uniformity and predictability? We believe that the 
answer to both these questions is in the negative, and that this compels the 
conclusion that Kulch was decided incorrectly. 
1. Kulch Has Usurped the Legislative Prerogative to Set Ohio Public Policy 
Prior to enacting the whistleblower statute,130 the General Assembly 
weighed, and debated, the respective interests of the public, employees, and 
employers)31 The result is a statute that protects the rights of whistleblowers 
and the interests of the public, but also safeguards the rights of employers by 
imposing certain conditions upon employees who seek the protections of the 
statute.132 The statute sets forth the procedural requirements that employees 
must meet to qualify as whistleblowers, as well as the remedies that the General 
Assembly deemed appropriate.l33 
130The General Assembly enacted the Whistleblower Protection Act, Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. section 4113.51, et seq., in response to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Phung. 
Siegel & Stephen, supra note 12, at 121. Compare Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,431 U.S. 720, 
736 (1977) (noting that amending legislation is an appropriate reaction by a legislature 
when it disagrees with a court's interpretation of legislation). 
l3lSee Provens v. Stark County Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental 
Disabilities, 594 N.E.2d at 965 (stating "the more appropriate course for this court is to 
defer to the legislative process of weighing conflicting policy considerations and 
creating certain administrative bodies and processes .... "). 
132Section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code provides that to qualify as a 
whistleblower under the statute, before going to the authorities with an alleged violation 
of law, an employee generally must orally notify the employer of the alleged violation, 
and then follow up with the employer in writing. If the violation is not corrected, or if 
the employer does not make a good-faith effort to correct the violation, within 
twenty-four hours, the employee may go to the appropriate authorities. An employee 
making such a report, however, also has a duty to make a reasonable and good-faith 
effort to determine the accuracy of any information reported. Id. 
133The available remedies include reinstatement, back wages, and reinstatement of 
fringe benefits and seniority rights. The court also may award a prevailing employee 
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Although other bodies might, of course, weigh the competing interests 
differently and arrive at different remedies, the legislature-not the 
courts-has been vested with primary responsibility for passing laws and 
setting Ohio public policy.l34 As one court explained: 
All questions of policy are for the determination of the legislature, and 
not for the courts .... Where courts intrude into their decrees their 
opinion on questions of public policy, they in effect constitute the 
judicial tribunals as lawmaking bodies in usurpation of the powers of 
the legislature.135 
Nothing in Kulch suggests that the court found the whistleblower statute to 
be defective.l36 Instead, the court simply conducted its own assessment of the 
remedies therein and reached the conclusion that these remedies "are not 
adequate to fully compensate an aggrieved employee .... "137 In the court's 
view, the more expansive remedies available for a public policy tort claim 
merely "complement the limited remedies available under the Whistleblower 
Statute."l38 
This reasoning is unpersuasive. As the Kulch dissenters observed, the 
majority improperly "elevat[ed] itself above the General Assembly as architect 
of Ohio's public policy."l39 Decisions about the adequacy of statutory remedies 
are for the legislature, not for the courts.l40 The Supreme Court of Ohio recently 
explained, 
costs of the litigation, together with witness fees, attorney fees, and fees for any experts 
who testify at trial. Finally, if the court determines that the employer deliberately 
retaliated against an employee, it may award interest on the award of back pay. 
134Phung v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986) ("The Ohio constitution 
delegates to the legislature the primary responsibility for protecting the welfare of 
employees."). 
135Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co., 789 S.W.2d 538,540-41 (Tenn. 1989). 
l36If a statute denies a plaintiff a "meaningful remedy," it violates Section 16, Article 
I of the Ohio Constitution, which guarantees citizens the right to open courts. Sorrell v. 
Thevenier, 633 N.E.2d 504,513 (Ohio 1994) (holding OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 2317.45 to 
be unconstitutional violation of this Constitutional provision). Compare Takach v. 
American Med. Tech. Inc., No. 72247, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 638, at "1 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Feb. 19, 1998) (dismissing a public policy tort claim of an employer's alleged violation 
of the Open Court provision of the Ohio Constitution after it discharged an employee 
for filing a lawsuit against a third party). 
137677N.E.2d at 324. 
138Jd. 
139 Id. at 330 (Cook, J., dissenting). 
140Austin v. HealthTrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1998). Discussing whether to 
recognize a common law cause of action for whistleblowers, the Austin court stated: 
In enacting statutes that prohibit certain conduct in the employment 
area, the Legislature has carefully balanced competing interests and 
policies. This has resulted in statutes not only with diverse protec-
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it is not a court's function to pass judgment on the wisdom of the 
legislation, for that is the task of the legislative body which enacted the 
legislation.141 
41 
The General Assembly could have included other remedies in the statute, 
but it did not. By including only the enumerated remedies, the legislature 
implicitly decided to exclude others.l42 For a court to add remedies to those 
available under the statute on the basis that they are merely "complementary" 
is to rewrite the statute, which is beyond the scope of its authority.143 
Courts are ill-equipped to serve as policy-making bodies.144 Legislatures, 
not reviewing courts, have the expertise, and the resources, to hold hearings, 
take evidence, conduct studies, receive input from constituents, debate 
alternatives, and, ultimately, to arrive at an appropriate balance of competing 
concerns. A reviewing court has none of these resources and, therefore, is not 
tions, but also with widely divergent remedies and varying proce-
dural requirements . 
. . . We do not doubt that significant policy interests are advanced when 
employers are prohibited from discriminating against employees who 
report violations of the law. However, the Legislature has enacted 
specific statutes to redress wrongful termination. While we are not 
bound by the Legislature's policy decisions when we consider whether 
to create a common-law whistleblower action, "the boundaries the 
Legislature has drawn do inform our decision." 
Id. at 403. Based on this reasoning, the Texas Supreme Court declined to recognize a 
common-law whistleblower claim. I d. 
141Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 172 (Ohio 1993); see also Sutowski v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 696 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 1998) ("It is, however, the role of the court to interpret the 
law, not to legislate."); State v. Knox, 656 N.E.2d 1046, 1047-48 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) ("It 
is a fundamental rule of statutory review that a court may not pass judgment on the 
wisdom of legislation or substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body."). 
142United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1534 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied,491 U.S. 
909 (1989) ("[W]e apply the long-honored rule of statutory construction, expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of others)"). 
143State ex rel. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,736 (1977) ("[C]onsiderations 
of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free 
to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation."); Brunswick v. Brunswick Hills 
Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 610 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) ("Courts may not 
judicially rewrite legislation under the guise of 'statutory construction.'"); Myers v. 
Chiaramonte, 348 N.E.2d 323,328 (Ohio 1976); see also Burlington Ind., Inc. v. Ellereth, 
118 s. Ct. 2257 (1998). 
144See,e.g., CityofCrownPointv. Rutherford,640N.E.2d 750,752 (Ind. Ct. App.l994) 
("courts are ill-equipped to evaluate the various factors determinative of legislative and 
executive decisions"); In re Guardianship of Matejski, 419 N.W.2d 576,581 (Iowa 1988) 
(Harris, J., dissenting) ("Courts are not equipped to pursue the paths for discovering 
wise policy."); Nix v. Preformed Line Prods. Co., 170 Cal. App. 3d 975, 987 (5th Dist. 
1985) (Best, J., concurring) ("courts are ill-equipped to decide questions of public policy 
which are essentially political in nature"). 
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well suited to "sit as a super-legislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of 
legislative policy determinations .... "145 
It is unclear what remains of statutory limits on whistleblower remedies after 
Kulch. Apparently, if an employee can identify a public policy in a statute, rule, 
regulation, or common law that supports public safety, or perhaps another 
policy such as public health or morals, compensatory and punitive damages 
are potentially recoverable without regard to the limits in section4113.52. After 
Kulch, employees may argue that they can simply bypass the more limited 
remedies in section 4113.52 and seek unlimited compensatory and punitive 
damages, with the result being that the public policy exception will swallow 
the statutory rule.146 
2. Kulch Has Engendered Further Confusion and Unpredictability in 
Ohio Employment Law 
In the last twelve years, the Ohio Supreme Court has vacillated on the scope 
of the public policy tort. In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Phung, in which 
it declined to recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge based on 
whistleblowing.l47 Four years later, in Greeley, the court did an about-face and 
held that such a cause of action exists. Justice Douglas, whose majority opinion 
for the court of appeals in Phung was reversed in 1986, wrote for a 4-3 majority 
in the Greeley decision.l48 
Just two years later, in Tulloh, the court held that a whistleblower claim based 
on common-law does not exist in Ohio.l49 Now, in Kulch, the court has come 
full circle by overruling Phung and Tulloh and recognizing that a common-law 
cause of action exists in Ohio for whistleblowing. 
These decisions illustrate the confusion and uncertainty in this area and belie 
the suggestion in Clarifying the Public Policy that Kulch has "laid to rest once and 
145Alford v. Republic Steel Corp.,467N.E.2d567,570-71 (Ohio Ct. App.1983); see also 
Pack v. Cleveland, 438 N.E.2d 434,443 (Ohio 1982) (Brown, J., dissenting) ("A judiciary 
should not sit as a super legislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative 
policy determinations."). 
146See, e.g., Daniel v. Carolina Sunrock Corp., 430 S.E.2d 306, 312 (N.C. Ct. App.) 
(Lewis, J., dissenting) (stating "eggshell sensitivity of ... 'narrow exception' to the 
employment at will doctrine will virtually swallow the rule"), rev'd, 435 N.E.2d 835 
(1993) (reversal based on the reasons stated in Judge Lewis'sdissent);Tatgev. Chambers 
& Owen, Inc., 565 N.W.2d 150, 152 (Wise. Ct. App.) (explaining public policy exception 
for wrongful discharge "would become the rule and the at-will doctrine would be 
swallowed up where employers and employees sign restrictive covenants"), review 
granted, 569 N.W.2d 589 (1997). 
147491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986). 
148551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 1990). 
149584 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 1992). 
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for all" any doubts regarding whether public policy remedies may be available 
notwithstanding the existence of statutory remedies.150 
The reality is that a bare majority of the court supported the judgment and 
syllabus. The opinion authored by Justice Sweeney commanded only three 
votes, with Justice Pfeifer concurring in judgment and syllabus only.151 
Therefore, the outcome of future cases is in doubt152 and may tum on changes 
in the composition of the court. 
Although Kulch admittedly answers some questions,153 these answers may 
prove ephemeral. Moreover, Kulch raises other, troublesome questions. For 
example, how far will the public policy tort be extended, or retrenched, in 
subsequent decisions? What other sources of public policy will be found to 
support a wrongful discharge claim for whistleblowing?154 How explicit must 
a preemption clause in a statute be in order for the court to find preemption? 
If the legislature unambiguously preempts nonstatutory remedies, will the 
statute withstand a constitutional challenge? And, after Kulch, is Provens still 
good law as to a public employee's right to assert a public policy claim, or is 
the demise of this case imminent? Presumably, the Supreme Court intends to 
address these (and other) questions on a case-by-case basis)55 
One unfortunate result of the court's erratic decisionmaking is that 
employers and employees who seek to conform their conduct to the law are 
left in the dark as to what the law, is, and what it will be in the foreseeable 
150C[arifying the Public Policy, supra note 118, at 683. 
151Greeley, Tulloh, and Painter were all decided by a 4-3 majority, at least as to the law 
of the syllabus. 
152Two recent cases in which the Supreme Court has granted discretionary appeals 
illustrate this uncertainty. In Davidson v. BP Am., Inc., Nos. 70170/71812, 1997 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 4712, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1997), appeal granted, 690 N.E.2d 1289 
(Ohio 1998), which involves a public policy whistleblower claim, four justices voted to 
hear the appeal. Chief Justice Moyer and Justices Cook and Lundberg Stratton dissented. 
In Valot v. Southeast Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., Port. App., No 96-P-0280, 1997 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 5563, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 12, 1997), appeal denied, 694 N.E.2d 78 (Ohio 
1998), another public policy discharge case, Justices Douglas, Resnick, and Sweeney 
dissented from the denial of the discretionary appeal. 
153For example, Kulch clarifies that Ohio public policy claims may be based on the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act. It also reaffirms the four-part test enunciated by 
Professor Perritt for assessing the viability of public policy tort. Kulch v. Structural 
Fibers, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 308, 322 (Ohio 1997). 
154In the dicta of Kulch, Justice Douglas suggested that the "public policy of this state 
demands a safe working environment" and that this "conclusion is supported by a host 
of statutes and constitutional provisions favoring safety in the workplace." Id. 
155"Full development of the elements of the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy in Ohio will result through litigation and resolution of future cases, as it 
is through this means that the common law develops." Painter v. Graley,639 N.E.2d 51, 
57 (Ohio 1994). 
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future.156 The court's unwillingness to be bound by stare decisis,157 together 
with its case-by-case approach and the internecine struggles158 within the 
court, only aggravate the problem.159 
B. Confusion and Unpredictability in Wrongful Discharge Litigation 
Notwithstanding Ms. Rosenthal's position that clarity has been achieved 
through Kulch, the first post-Kulch decision illustrates that Kulch sowed new 
seeds of confusion. By remanding a public policy claim for age discrimination 
"on the authority of Kulch," in Livingston,160 the court has given the impression 
that a public policy claim is available on this basis. Unfortunately, the court 
provided absolutely no guidance to lower courts regarding the elements of this 
"claim," including how it interplays with statutory age discrimination 
clairns.l61 
156A recent article explained some of the consequences of legal uncertainty. For 
example, some employers will be reluctant to terminate marginal employees, which 
may cause a reduced demand for new workers. Such uncertainty leads to a sort of 
"regressive tax" on potential employees. Wagoner, Jr., supra note 77, at 1825 n.101. In 
addition, an employer may retain marginal employees to avoid litigation, even where 
there is a labor surplus, which may result in less productivity, less efficient 
manufacturing, and increased employee morale problems. Id. at 1826 n.l02. 
157Jd. at 1826 n.109 ('The Supreme Court of Ohio has been rather cavalier when 
dealing with stare decisis in past public policy cases."). 
158Takach v. American Med. Tech. Inc., 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 638 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Feb. 19, 1998), appeal allowed, 696 N .E.2d 1088 (Ohio 1998), provides yet another example 
ofthe struggles within the court on the public policy issue. In Takach, the court of appeals 
rejected an employee's public policy claim based on the "open courts" amendment to 
the Ohio Constitution. There, the employee resigned when her employer placed 
restrictions on her job duties after she filed a products liability claim against one of the 
employer's suppliers. The appellate court affirmed the court's rejection of the 
employee's public policy discharge claim, noting that the supreme court had previously 
rejected a public policy claim based on the Ohio constitution. Apparently, the court 
intends to revisit this question because it has allowed a discretionary appeal of this case 
over the dissent of Chief Justice Moyer and Justices Cook and Lundberg Stratton. 
159There are other troubling aspects of this decision as well. The dissent notes that it 
is illogical to hold, as the majority does, that an Ohio public policy claim can be based 
on a federal statute (OSHA) that does not provide a private right of action. As it has 
done with the whistleblower statute, the court severs the federal policies of OSHA, 
which are premised on the legislative determination that the Secretary, and not private 
litigants, should enforce the statute, from the statutory remedies. 
160Livingston v. Hillside Rehabilitation Hosp., 680 N.E.2d 1220, 1221 (Ohio 1997). 
161 Justice Cook, in dissent, criticized the majority for failing to provide any legal 
analysis to support its decision: 
Given that Kulch was decided based on the perceived inadequacy of 
the statutorily prescribed remedy available to a discharged whistle-
blower, one would expect this case, where the age discrimination statute 
has no restriction on remedies, to be affirmed. 
Id. at 1221. 
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Moreover, Ohio courts and federal courts construing Ohio law have 
struggled to understand the limits of the public policy tort as it presently exists. 
The recent decision of Sutton v. Salkin162 is, perhaps, illustrative. This case 
involved, not an employment dispute, but the enforceability of a preprinted 
arbitration clause that required a consumer to arbitrate disputes. The consumer 
sought to take her dispute to small claims court rather than arbitrate, as agreed 
upon in the contract. The municipal court ordered her to arbitrate. 
The court of appeals reversed. After acknowledging that there is a "strong 
presumption" in favor of arbitration under these circumstances, the court 
nonetheless held that it would "circumvent the public policy favoring 
resolution of small claims" to enforce the arbitration clause.163 Particularly 
troublesome is the court's candid acknowledgement that its decision was not 
informed "by any statutory or judicially created authority .... "164 
Unfortunately, this case signals that Ohio courts have moved a step closer to 
the position that judges can decide cases based on their personal views of what 
the law should be, in derogation of what the law is. 
Two recent federal district court decisions also are illustrative of the 
uncertainty in this area. In Dorricott v. Fairhill Center for Aging,165 the court 
dismissed a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of "the public policy 
against terminating employees who take leave."166 Dorricott had taken a 
medical leave of absence for emotional distress associated with alleged sexual 
harassment. After she exhausted available medical leave, she requested an 
extension. The employer declined to extend the leave and warned the 
employee that she would be terminated if she did not return to work. When 
the employee failed to return to work, the employer discharged her.l67 
According to Justice Cook, the only difference between the age discrimination 
statute and the age discrimination public policy tort approved by the Livingston court 
was the right to a jury trial. Id. Since the General Assembly had not provided for a jury 
trial in the age discrimination statute, Justice Cook criticized the Livingston majority for 
substituting its personal public policy choice for a contrary public policy statement by 
the Ohio legislature. 
This is not the first time that the court has decided a case involving wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy under the discrimination statutes. In Collins v. 
Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995), the court held that "a cause of action may be 
brought for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based on sexual 
harassment/ discrimination." Id. at syllabus. 
162No. 721707, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 382, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 5, 1998). 
163Jd. at *4. 
164Jd. 
1652 F. Supp. 2d 982 (N.D. Ohio 1998). 
166Jd. at 993. 
167Jd. at 982 (internal citations omitted). 
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
46 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:19 
The employee brought claims for, among other things, retaliation for filing 
a sexual harassment charge and wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy. After acknowledging Kulch, the Dorricott court stated: 
Congress has obviously spoken on the issue of ... family medical leave 
in the workplace by enacting comprehensive statutes as legislative 
statements of public policy in this area. As the Painter court noted, 
''Judicial policy preferences may not be used to override valid 
legislative enactments, for the legislature should be the final arbiter of 
public policy. Because the legislature has enunciated public policy and 
provided remedial schemes to protect employees in this area, this 
Court will not override the scheme .... 168 
Accordingly, it appears that this court gave Kulch a restrictive reading. 
Wallace v. Trumbull Memorial Hospita[169 illustrates a contrary interpretation 
of the scope of Kulch. In that case, an employee brought an action for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy and for age and disability 
discrimination. Although the employee failed to state a claim under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, and the employee's age claim was 
time-barred, the Wallace court permitted the employee to pursue his public 
policy claim.l70 Relying on Kulch, the district court stated: "[T]he mere existence 
of statutory remedies does not[,] without more, operate to bar a claim for 
wrongful discharge unless the remedies available under the statute are 
sufficient to provide the complete relief that would otherwise be available in a 
common law cause of action for wrongful discharge."171 
Dorricott and Wallace provide further evidence that as a result of judicial 
expansion of the public policy tort, including Kulch, the decision to discharge 
an employee is fraught with uncertainty and presents greater risks than in the 
past.172 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Kulch decision reflects an attempt by the Supreme Court of Ohio to shape 
public policy, a role better left to the legislature. This decision will lead to 
168Jd. at 993 (quoting Gall v. Quaker City Castings, 874 F. Supp. 161, 164 (N.D. Ohio 
1995)). 
169970 F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Ohio 1997). 
170Jd. at 621. 
171Jd. 
1720ther examples include the following recent authorities: Bell v. Cuyahoga 
Community College, No. 73245, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 3741 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 13, 
1998) (declining to recognize a cause of action for harassment in violation of public 
policy); Powers v. SpringfieldSch., No. 98-CA-10, 19980hioApp. LEXIS2827 (Ohio Ct. 
App. June 26, 1998) (recognizing a public claims for wrongful promotion in violation of a 
statute requiring certain professionals to report child abuse where the employee failed 
to comply with the requirements of the Whistleblower Protection Act). 
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greater confusion and unpredictability in an already muddled area of the law. 
We believe that in Kulch, the better course would have been for the Supreme 
Court to defer to the legislature, which carefully delineated the appropriate 
procedures and remedies for Ohio whistleblowers in the statute. Employers 
and employees alike can only hope that in the coming years, Ohio courts will 
demonstrate a more cautious approach when analyzing public policy, thereby 
bringing some stability to Ohio employment law. 
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